

TOP SECRET

25X1



18 March 1956

25X1




25X1

Copy No. 103




CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 50
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 2010
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 14 Jan 89 REVIEWER 

25X1

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1



State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

CONTENTS

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1A 2. JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER WILLING TO TALK WITH
CHOU [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X6

4. POSITION OF HUNGARIAN PARTY LEADER RAKOSI
APPEARS THREATENED [REDACTED]

25X1A

5. PREMIER MOLLET CONCERNED OVER ANTI-AMERICAN
SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [REDACTED]

25X1A

* * * *

25X1A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1


Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

25X1A

2. JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER WILLING TO TALK WITH CHOU

25X1A

 Prime Minister Hatoyama told an upper house committee on 15 March that he is willing to meet Chinese Communist premier Chou En-lai to discuss the establishment of closer relations between Tokyo and Peiping, which "everyone desires." Hatoyama emphasized that the "difficulty" is Japan's treaty with Nationalist China, a problem which he said could be removed by Chinese Communist "recognition" of Taipei.

A Foreign Ministry official has informed the American embassy in Tokyo that Peiping probably would respond quickly to Hatoyama's remarks, possibly by making some "major proposition" just prior to Secretary of State Dulles' visit to Tokyo.

Comment

A spokesman for the Peiping regime renewed on 16 March the Chinese Communist offer to discuss the normalization of relations, although he did not mention Hatoyama's remarks. Chou En-lai may soon follow up this offer, and, in order to engage the Japanese prime minister in such talks, Chou may refrain temporarily from denouncing Hatoyama's proposal for two Chinas.

Virtually all Japanese believe that if Japan is to achieve economic independence and assume its rightful role as a power in the Far East, normal diplomatic relations with Communist China are necessary. Tokyo's desire for relations with Peiping is strengthened by its belief that the Chinese Nationalist regime will not last more than two more years and certainly will not survive Chiang Kai-shek's death.

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

4. POSITION OF HUNGARIAN PARTY LEADER RAKOSI
APPEARS THREATENED

Reported dissension within the Hungarian party's central committee over the status of ex-premier Imre Nagy indicates that Party Secretary Rakosi is

still having difficulty in asserting his leadership.

Nagy has petitioned the central committee to withdraw the charges against him which led to his conviction for "rightist deviation" a year ago. The request prompted "heated discussion" within the committee at its meeting on 12 and 13 March.

Reportedly Istvan Kovacs, Nagy's chief supporter in the central committee, argued that Rakosi's proposal to ignore Nagy's request was impossible in view of statements at the Soviet congress. Kovacs, a politburo member who accompanied Rakosi to the Soviet 20th Party Congress, insisted that Rakosi had no right to decide the matter alone. Rakosi apparently attempted to defend himself on the ground that the Soviet congress had endorsed his policies as leader of the Hungarian party.

The defensive statements contained in Rakosi's report on the congress tend to support reports of division within the central committee and to indicate that the recent Soviet party congress has strengthened the opposition of nationalist elements within the party. Since he ousted Nagy, Rakosi has had difficulty in controlling nationalist elements within the party despite Moscow's support of his leadership. Even a gradual rehabilitation of Nagy would seriously threaten Rakosi's leadership of the party.

5. **PREMIER MOLLET CONCERNED OVER ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN FRANCE**

25X1A

[REDACTED] In a conversation on 10 March, Premier Mollet told American UN delegate Lodge that he was disturbed by the anti-American sentiment the Algerian situation has stimulated in France, not merely among the

Communists but also among certain elements of the French right which sought to find a scapegoat "abroad" for their troubles in Algeria.

Mollet protested that although he had no cause for complaint over the official attitude of the United States government, he did complain that many American businessmen and working-level officials had caused friction by giving unsolicited advice. Another factor in French-American misunderstanding was the "blanket stand" taken by the American press against what it calls "colonialism." He said the most hard hitting passages in its editorials are picked up and reprinted by the French press.

Comment

Other reports suggest that anti-American sentiment in France is considerably more widespread than Mollet indicated. It stems in part from the French belief that American influence in Vietnam has supplanted France without regard to French interests there, and that a similar pattern is in the making in North Africa.

According to a 17 March press report, the French Secretary of State for Operations in Algeria criticized the United States' "long silence" and said he expects an "unequivocal" declaration of its solidarity with France on the Algerian crisis.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002400540001-5